Holy Shit! Second Boeing 737 Max 8 crashes in a year! - (Thread references events from 2019.)

[Schnellbandit]

trump just grounded all 737 max

i wonder why trump would do this and not some top faa personnel

also this thread should help give support to the other one in general

whats more dangerous airplanes or motos?

I responded statistically we have found every moto/rider remains, where airplanes have literally disappeared, how can they say airplanes are safer then motos when you got missing bodies/planes is mesmerizing.

Well, news broadcasts are now asking why he waited so long, so there's that.

 

[AbsolutEnduser]

Well, news broadcasts are now asking why he waited so long, so there's that.

Not now, they asked two days ago already.

Ooh, look at that! Fox news, Now Playing: "Boeing faces fresh scrutiny after second deadly flight: Is the FAA doing enough?"

As a former airline instructor pilot, far more comforting to me, moving forward, would be the knowledge that Max 8 crews everywhere complete full-motion simulator training [which is not currently done..] that includes scenarios recognizing MCAS malfunctions – and successful recoveries.

 

[Johndicezx9]

trump just grounded all 737 max

i wonder why trump would do this and not some top faa personnel

I thought I saw the current head of the FAA is only “acting”, as in either temporary or not yet approved.

 

[auntiebling]

It's not counter intuitive, ......

is it true that it takes 3 separate steps to completely return control to the pilot in this scenario where the AOA is flipping out?

something like "auto pilot off" "power to auto pilot off" "shoot AOA sensor in the head"

it should be obvious i don't know what i'm talking about but "heard this somewhere" just looking for some verification

if so that seems like 2 extra steps to remember when you're falling out of the sky.

 

[msethhunter]

I want you as my pilot Mikey. "Fly the damn airplane". The above is what defines you as a legit stickman....great post. Legit.

I talked to my good friend who's high up in one of the majors (you know who, I think) and his perspective was enlightening. I asked "can't they just turn the system off for each flight"...to which he said "yeah, but it's too late now". HIs thought was what the industry was speculating: faulty sensor or software with the sensor where the aircraft is giving away climb rate due to an AOA issue, etc. I suspect Boeing knows something about it.

Question: was this system designed for less experienced pilots as a safety measure in itself?



Because the FAA is notoriously slow and toothless when it counts.

In my opinion, yes. The rules have changed because we are facing a shortage of experience in the industry. We are seeing guys getting hired right now that wouldn't have even been considered just 5 years ago. The good thing is that there are still plenty of guys sitting in the opposite seat (whether it's the captain or the first officer) who have a wealth of knowledge to keep things safe. You just don't see that much overseas though. Explanation below (MPL license).

The system in the MAX and similar airplanes is necessary, but only in a deep stall. There is enough available thrust that you could get the airplane in a position that there isn't enough elevator authority to get the nose down due to the available thrust below the center of gravity (think center of rotation). It causes pitch changes in normal flight with large increases or decreases in thrust in a normal regime, so when you go well beyond a normal regime, like a deep stall (how the fuck did you let it get that bad in the first place), they are now starting to build airplanes to the lowest common denominator, and designing training programs the same, especially overseas, and especially with state run airlines.

I've been flying nearly my entire life. I taught aerobatics when I was a flight instructor, flew sick patients, CEO's and celebs. I've flown cargo into airports in turboprops single pilot where there used to be two, in weather that people don't go outside in (ever seen a real blizzard in Minot ND? I have). Been to every continent.....and I still learn something new every time I fly. The issue I see with a lot of these foreign carriers is they've never done any of that. A lot of them have certificates that the FAA is moving towards called an MPL, "Multi Crew Pilots License". You can only fly something that takes a crew of two or more. I don't know if that's been the case with these guys, but it completely skips all the valuable learning that takes place in smaller, more forgiving airplanes that builds tremendous experience I made plenty of mistakes in those. Some that I'm lucky to be here from still. Beer time stories. MPL is a really bad idea.

Today I get to fly an airplane...when we are experiencing one of the worst spring storms in the last decade, that the ice detection system is inop. I still remember when I got into my first airplane that had that. We used to use the Mark1 eyeball, and pay attention. Now, for the most part, it's all automatic. So guess what the procedure is for when that's broken? Revert back to the Mark1 eyeball, and pay attention. Typical, we'll see a loss in airspeed when we start accumulating ice. Imagine someone who's only flown something that has that system, stepping into an airplane where it's either broken, or doesn't have it, and they are wondering why it's taking so much more power to maintain speed now (think MPL in advanced aircraft). That's the experience I'm talking about. That's the foreign system that's not being addressed. We have a requirement in the US (post Colgan 3407) that sets a minimum standard for people wishing to fly for the airlines. They lack that overseas in most countries. It's helped here, but just.

I'm not a super pilot. I'm an average pilot. But I'm in my 13th year of doing it professionally, and have been a certificated pilot for over 20. In the next year or so, I'll have spent the equivalent of a full year airborne. When you look at these foreign carriers, they'll allow guys into the cockpit with just 250 hours, sometimes less. The airplane is an issue here, but the lack of flying experience is in lock step with it. Accidents are chain events. Sometimes you can break that chain with experience.

 

[Climber]

To me, the bottom line is that if the Auto Pilot can get into a state where it will crash the plane if not over-ridden, then it is a Fail. Given that passenger lives are on the line, it is an unacceptable Fail.

Yeah, properly trained pilots can deal with it if they respond quickly enough, but that is entirely besides the point.

Piss poor programming that they didn't cover this case properly, given the nature of the potential outcome. I' saying this as a 28 year professional software engineer who has worked on many different types of systems and programs. They fucked up. Period.

 

[dravnx]

Many autopilots will put the aircraft into a state where it will crash if not operated correctly. In my world of light twin and single engine aircraft, all of the autopilots will crash the aircraft.
The MCAS is not an autopilot.

 

[msethhunter]

To me, the bottom line is that if the Auto Pilot can get into a state where it will crash the plane if not over-ridden, then it is a Fail. Given that passenger lives are on the line, it is an unacceptable Fail.

Yeah, properly trained pilots can deal with it if they respond quickly enough, but that is entirely besides the point.

Piss poor programming that they didn't cover this case properly, given the nature of the potential outcome. I' saying this as a 28 year professional software engineer who has worked on many different types of systems and programs. They fucked up. Period.

GIGO.

Garbage In, Garbage Out. And I have yet to see an autopilot that will actually crash the plane if it's working right.

 

[Schnellbandit]

A common evolution. The more something is automated the more dependencies are created.

Watch the original Fail-Safe movie where the owner of a company making the systems talks about the subtle errors that can lead to disasters like the one in the subject of the movie. Scary but there is nothing that is fail-safe.

We can reduce the probabilities of failures but that too has it's own problem. The more reliable something is the less we worry about it. Then when it does fail, having put so much faith into it and putting more and more demand upon it, the number of people affected and the damage is very great.

When they have a fix, who is going to believe it?

 

[afm199]

GIGO.

Garbage In, Garbage Out. And I have yet to see an autopilot that will actually crash the plane if it's working right.

You're correct in your assumption that this is piss poor training. Boeing is correct in grounding them. One more crash would cost the company hugely. That's the bottom line. They don't do what they did out of any moral or ethical imperative. It's entirely a bottom line decision.

 

[Climber]

GIGO.

Garbage In, Garbage Out. And I have yet to see an autopilot that will actually crash the plane if it's working right.

But. This one isn't working right. Correct?

In Software Engineering, you have to account for every possible situation that can occur, it it can happen 1 time out of a million, you have to handle it because it's possible to happen. If human lives are at stake, it's even more important.

 

[Schnellbandit]

But. This one isn't working right. Correct?

In Software Engineering, you have to account for every possible situation that can occur, it it can happen 1 time out of a million, you have to handle it because it's possible to happen. If human lives are at stake, it's even more important.

A nice theory but you don't know what you don't know. There is no such thing as accounting for every possible situation, especially in software engineering (or anything else) unless you operate in a vacuum.

The person who thinks they can account for every situation is the person who thinks they know far more than they do. They are probably also involved in the selling of whatever that thing is.

 

[AbsolutEnduser]

You might have a slight mistake there Climber.
AFAIH it's not the Autopilot, but it's the MCAS, which is working only if the Autopilot is off. This has been covered in above posts and in the news.

Let's abstract ourselves of the MCAS, AOA for a few seconds, and just say: whatever it is, planes have fallen. So, something is wrong. In fact, all facts combined, "new plane", "MCAS", "MCAS was not even announced to the pilots", "to turn off MCAS overriding you, you have to ~"interfere with it"~ (WTF!!!)" look pretty fishy.

Here's are some things about the "training" (i.e the lack of):
This article has LOTS of facts inside:

• MCAS was completely unannounced to any pilots before the Lion Air
• Pilots WERE actually upset.. USA pilots, nonetheless, and met with Boeing right after the Lion Air!
• they were "given training" but it was a 1hr iPAD training, which is confirmed by another person in the Fox article I posted earlier,
• this actually means (incl the info in the article), that there was no training on the MCAS.. but on other new features of the Max, i.e. screens (see: article)
• The USA pilots had the advantage they're not in Ethiopia or the East; they were closer and had a meeting on US-soil
• if there was actually a safety bulletin by Boeing on how to override/battle the MCAS (*), it hasn't been mentioned in these articles, or eluded me (lots of words there)

... connect the dots why the things happened in other continents.

(*) but again.. why would you.. "battle" the MCAS?
It's almost as if they've been hiding something. E.g. they have denied reports to do more investigation or training as long as any incidents "have not been connected to the MCAS"? i.e. "oh if it's not about that, let's forget about it"? Weird.
Well we'll see what the backlash will be after it settles.

 

[msethhunter]

But. This one isn't working right. Correct?

In Software Engineering, you have to account for every possible situation that can occur, it it can happen 1 time out of a million, you have to handle it because it's possible to happen. If human lives are at stake, it's even more important.

Aviation doesn't work that way. There are more variables than you can account for which is why humans should never be taken out of the cockpit.

This wasn't the autopilot. This was automation that I can't honestly speculate on whether or not it was working correctly, because I don't know yet. Computers crash, even brand new ones, because GIGO. It's going to do exactly what it is told to do... no thinking...no questions.

I wish I could take you through a full blown sin event so the pieces would fall into place.

 

[Climber]

You might have a slight mistake there Climber.
AFAIH it's not the Autopilot, but it's the MCAS, which is working only if the Autopilot is off. This has been covered in above posts and in the news.

Let's abstract ourselves of the MCAS, AOA for a few seconds, and just say: whatever it is, planes have fallen. So, something is wrong. In fact, all facts combined, "new plane", "MCAS", "MCAS was not even announced to the pilots", "to turn off MCAS overriding you, you have to ~"interfere with it"~ (WTF!!!)" look pretty fishy.

Here's are some things about the "training" (i.e the lack of):
This article has LOTS of facts inside:

• MCAS was completely unannounced to any pilots before the Lion Air
• Pilots WERE actually upset.. USA pilots, nonetheless, and met with Boeing right after the Lion Air!
• they were "given training" but it was a 1hr iPAD training, which is confirmed by another person in the Fox article I posted earlier,
• this actually means (incl the info in the article), that there was no training on the MCAS.. but on other new features of the Max, i.e. screens (see: article)
• The USA pilots had the advantage they're not in Ethiopia or the East; they were closer and had a meeting on US-soil
• if there was actually a safety bulletin by Boeing on how to override/battle the MCAS (*), it hasn't been mentioned in these articles, or eluded me (lots of words there)

... connect the dots why the things happened in other continents.

(*) but again.. why would you.. "battle" the MCAS?
It's almost as if they've been hiding something. E.g. they have denied reports to do more investigation or training as long as any incidents "have not been connected to the MCAS"? i.e. "oh if it's not about that, let's forget about it"? Weird.
Well we'll see what the backlash will be after it settles.

Thanks for the info and the patience.

 

[bojangle]

Aviation doesn't work that way. There are more variables than you can account for which is why humans should never be taken out of the cockpit.

This wasn't the autopilot. This was automation that I can't honestly speculate on whether or not it was working correctly, because I don't know yet. Computers crash, even brand new ones, because GIGO. It's going to do exactly what it is told to do... no thinking...no questions.

I wish I could take you through a full blown sin event so the pieces would fall into place.

Thanks for all your informative posts.

 

[Climber]

Aviation doesn't work that way. There are more variables than you can account for which is why humans should never be taken out of the cockpit.

This wasn't the autopilot. This was automation that I can't honestly speculate on whether or not it was working correctly, because I don't know yet. Computers crash, even brand new ones, because GIGO. It's going to do exactly what it is told to do... no thinking...no questions.

I wish I could take you through a full blown sin event so the pieces would fall into place.

Ok, did some research on the MCAS, which if I interpret it correctly (Sours) is a largely unannounced fly-by-wire overlay of what the pilots are doing. In other words, it activates override when certain flight characteristics are encountered and brings the nose back down when it senses that the nose is too high for the speed and/or phase to avoid a stall. Good so far?

If I read what happened with the other crash correctly, it received some faulty signals from sensor(s) and brought the nose too far down, resulting in a crash.

My question about the system is, where is the redundancy in the sensor's and where is the fail-safe by querying other factors to ensure that the sensor's weren't giving back false data?

I was involved with Nuclear Submarines early in my Mechanical Engineering career and every critical system had triple redundancy.

Mikey, did I characterize it correctly?

 

[msethhunter]

Ok, did some research on the MCAS, which if I interpret it correctly (Sours) is a largely unannounced fly-by-wire overlay of what the pilots are doing. In other words, it activates override when certain flight characteristics are encountered and brings the nose back down when it senses that the nose is too high for the speed and/or phase to avoid a stall. Good so far?

If I read what happened with the other crash correctly, it received some faulty signals from sensor(s) and brought the nose too far down, resulting in a crash.

My question about the system is, where is the redundancy in the sensor's and where is the fail-safe by querying other factors to ensure that the sensor's weren't giving back false data?

I was involved with Nuclear Submarines early in my Mechanical Engineering career and every critical system had triple redundancy.

Mikey, did I characterize it correctly?

Oh Brett.....I can almost see you at the bottom of the rabbit hole. Don't worry bud, I'll try and throw you a rope.

Yes, you've mostly described it right. But it's late, and I've been on duty for 12 hours now, so I'm to beat to access the brain power to describe it so here's a decent article that describes it, and Boeing's reasons for not disclosing it in its manuals.

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-...aracteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/

And this one

https://www.google.com/amp/s/phys.org/news/2019-03-ethiopian-airlines-mcas-boeing-max.amp

Of important note, there are ways to override the MCAS system. It's very similar to a trim runaway. It honestly sounds like these two groups of pilots failed to do just that. That's not to say the system isn't flawed, but that these pilots failed to follow the procedure. I don't fly a Boeing, never have. But everything I have flown has a way to completely cut a system out of the loop, and there is a way to do it on the 737 just like every other type I am certificated to fly.

It honestly sounds like a flaw in software that shouldn't have gotten these guys, did. And the accident chain involved a flawed system, and guys who had poor systems knowledge that should have transferred over from the trim system directly into the MCAS system since they are so similar. The way the article describes it is as if it was a stick pusher even, not a trim runway (which sounds like an MCAS'ism). I hope that that's making sense, and I'll try and circle back to this tomorrow. It's go home day tomorrow, and I'll have one objective on my mind.... trying to get home when I'm done.

 

[tzrider]

Mikey, if pilots didn’t know about the existence of MCAS, would they already know to use manual trim or would they assume that using the stick should bring the nose back up?

 

[planegray]

GIGO.

Garbage In, Garbage Out. And I have yet to see an autopilot that will actually crash the plane if it's working right.

Remember, "anecdote does not equal data"
I appreciate that you are giving a lot of good info, but your inability to validate anyone else's info gives me pause.

In regards to your autopilot observation, maybe you should read up on the 747 out of SFO some years ago where an engine failed and the crew failed to notice. The autopilot held until it couldn't, then kicked off. The a/c did a snap roll and headed for the ocean. The crew pulled out, but the plane was seriously damaged.

Btw, fixing autopilots is what dravnx does