The Oroville problem wasn't that simple. I spent way too much time reading about it during the crisis. It's actually really interesting.
Basically, they tried to reduce the damage happening to the main spillway by reducing its outflow. When the alternate water pathways proved unsafe, they then had to match outflow to the incoming water, PLUS more to get the water levels back down.
The problem was not that the damaged spillway couldn't do it. It was that the levee system around Sacramento couldn't handle the max flow of the dam.
At a designed max flow of 290,000 gallons per second, Oroville's main spillway alone is capable of maxing out the Sacramento levee systems flow capacity. But the levees are fed by a number of sources that were all experiencing high flow rates at the time. In fact, the water controllers of Oroville were sued once for causing levee failures and Sacramento flooding a decade or so ago when they released a high flow rate that did not seem warranted at the time.
So back on topic with Berryessa. Part of designing a spillway is determining the total watershed area that feeds the lake and thus max inflow possible. If properly designed, the spillway and other systems in the dam can pass max inflow right on through. They don't want that, of course, because that basically means flooding below the dam. (As would have happened before the dam existed)